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COMMENT.
In no other branch, is the law so dependent upon scientific
theories and discoveries, as it is in that of electricity. The judi-
cial decisions of to-day may be modified or reversed by a better
understanding of the laws which regulate this mysterious power,
and inventions of the future may altogether obviate many of the
very difficulties which now seem inseparable from its use. The
case of the .Hudson River Telphone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike &-
R. R. Co., 32 N. E. Rep. 148 (N. Y.), well illustrates the delicate
questions which may arise on this subject.
Here, both plaintiff and defendant occupied the streets with
their wires. The former to connect their telephones; the latter
to transmit power to their cars operated by the single trolley-sys-
tem. The plaintiff complained that the light and pulsating cur-
rent which they used, and which is necessary for the best results
in telephone service, was destroyed by the stronger, unsteady one,
employed by the defendant, both through induction and conduc-
tion, and desired an injunction to prevent the railroad company
from thus injuring their business.
The charter of the plaintiff gave them the privilege of occu-
pying the highway with their wires, provided they did not inter-
fere with the public travel thereby. Maynard J. held, that the
appeal must be denied on the strength of this provision, which
made the plaintiff's charter of a subordinate character; but he
goes on to say, "the plaintiff is not using the streets for one of
the purposes to which they have been dedicated as public high-
ways, while the defendant is occupying them in such a manner as
to expedite public travel and promote the public use, to which
they were originally devoted. The condition contained in the
plaintiff's grant would have been implied if it had not been
expressed." The defendant therefore has the primary right to
the street from the nature of its business of providing means
for public transit, and even though injury may result to the plain-
tiff's business from the strong current of electricity necessary
for the operation of the system which has been adopted (and
which has been found by a referee to be not only safe but the
best now known), this is in itself no ground for action, for "the
inconveniences or loss which others may suffer from the adoption
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of a mode of locomotion authorized by law, which is carefully
and skillfully employed and which does not destroy or impair the
usefulness of the street as a public way, is not sufficient cause
for a recovery." This, necessarily, disposed of the plaintiff's
ground for complaint on account of damage due to induction from
the defendant's wires in the street. In discussing the injury from
conduction, however, a more difficult question was developed.
In the use of every electric current a complete circuit is nec-
essary. One half of this is made by the wires, the return being
effected through the earth. The plaintiff made its ground
connections on the land of its subscribers by attaching the wire
to the gas or water pipe. The defendant attained the same
object by discharging their current into the earth by means of
the rails, from which it flowed through the ground to plaintiff's
wires (which were now on private property, on which they were
licensees), and caused even more serious disturbance than had
the induction between the wires in the streets. As to defendant's
liability on this point the court does not commit itself, however,
though it draws an analogy between this case and that of a per-
son collecting water on his own premises in large quantities and
allowing it to escape on the land of another. "We are not pre-
pared to hold that a person, even in .the prosecution of a lawful
trade or business upon his own land, can gather there by artificial
means a natural element like electricity and discharge it in such
a volume that, owing to the conductive properties of the earth,
it will be conveyed upon the grounds of his neighbor with such
force and to such an extent as to break up his business or
impair the value of his property, and not be held responsible for
the resulting injury. * * * But the record before us does not
require a determination of the question in this form," for since
this use of the earth is a necessary consequent of the use of the
plaintiff's indivisible charter and, as before stated, their franchise
is subservient to that of the defendant, -where a conflict of rights
arises the plaintiff must give way. The plaintiff uses its fran-
chise by the grant, subject to the rights of public passage, "and
it cannot question the form in which such right shall be enjoyed
so long as it is of lawful origin and is utilized with proper care
and skill. The defendant's mode of conveyance of passengers is
of this character, and the plaintiff can no more justly complain of
its loss from this source than it could if by the jarring of loaded
vehicles passing up and down Broadway its delicate and sensitive
instruments were displaced and their beneficial use impaired or
destroyed."
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Two cases have been decided recently which are interesting as
showing how litigation based on a similar state of facts may lead
to directly opposite results in different States. Yordy v. Marshall
County, 53 N. W. Rep. 298 (Iowa), and Clulow v. McClelland, 25
Atl. Rep. 147 (Penna.) In each instance an action was brought
to recover damages for injuries to a steam threshing machine,
caused by the breaking of a bridge on the highway. Each court
referred with approval to the doctrine laid down in McCormick v.
Towdshop of Washington, 112 Pa. St. 185, that a "township is not
required to assume that its bridges will be used in an unusual
manner, either by crossing at great speed or by the passing of a
very large and unusual weight." The point, therefore, on which
the decisions turned was whether it was an unusual use of bridges
to transport steam threshing machines over them. In Iowa it
was held that whether such use was unusual and extraordinary
was for the jury to decide, and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
was sustained. But in the Pennsylvania case, the court decided
that the use was unusual as a matter of law, and that the judg-
ment of the lower court against the plaintiff should be affirmed.
Chief Justice Paxson remarked, however, that when the transpor-
tation of such machines over bridges should become so frequent
in that State as to amount to an ordinary use, "it may be neces-
sary to strengthen the bridges so as to withstand the increased
strain."
If we can accept the authority of Chaucer, the dominating
power in woman is the desire to rule supreme in all her domestic
relations. This is well illustrated in the recent New Jersey case
of Shinn v. Shinn, 24 Atl. Rep. 1022. Here the husband immedi-
ately after marriage led his wife home to a house of which he
himself was the owner, but which was occupied by a large num-
ber of his relatives. The wife had one room set apart for her
use; she had comforts and conveniences suitable to her husband's
situation in life, but she had no part in running and managing the
household. Repining under this regime she left her home and
took up her abode with a relative, alleging that all the household
had united in ill-treating and abusing her. A correspondence
between her husband and herself ensued, in which he formally
offered to receive her back; but she refused to return, and
brought an action against him for her support. An agreement
between them was patched up, by the terms of which the husband
took a separate house for their joint use. But here was another
disappointment, for he furnished it in a very humble and meagre
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way, and basely refused to allow her friends admission. So the
truce was broken, and the suspended action was resumed. The
court held, in passing on the case, that the husband's action in de-
manding her return, and later in taking a separate house, was
merely a screen to escape the legal liability, which his real atti-
tude towards his wife exposed him to; that every wife is entitled
to a home suited to her husband's position in life, over which she
can preside as mistress; and that a house in which the husband
and wife are mere boarders, while the control thereof is in others,
does not furnish such a home as the wife is entitled to, even if the
ownership of the property does vest, as here, in the hard-hearted
husband.
*
Two recent decisions-Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 15 S. E.
Rep. iooo (W. Va.) and State v. Loomis, 20 S. W. Rep. 332 (Mo.)-
handed down within a week of each other, in different States,
illustrate to what extent the power of police regulation will be
applied when necessary to uphold a beneficent statute. The
practice known in England as the "Truck system" of issuing in
payment of wages what is called "scrip," became very prevalent
in this country along with the' development of mining and manu-
facturing industries. This was more especially true of mining.
Each well-regulated mining establishment had its "company
store" to which its employes must go with their store orders or
tIscrip" and be required to take "store pay" in return for their
labor. The evils of such a system are apparent. Oftentimes the
profits made by the store exceeded those of the business to which
it was contingent. In consequence of these abuses a number of
States have passed laws for -the purpose of abolishing such a sys-
tem, and both the cases above mentioned arose from prosecutions
for the violation of such statutes.
The West Virginia Court had a precedent in State v. Goodwill,
33 W. Va. 179, and State v. Coal &- Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188, in
both of which the Court held that a statute prohibiting persons,
firms and corporations engaged in mining and manufacturing
from issuing any order or other paper in payment of wages unless
it purports to be redeemable for its face value in lawful money, is
unconstitutional on the ground that it is class legislation, and
unreasonably infringes the right of contract. But in Peel Splint
Coal Co. v. State a statute containing prohibitions of the same gen-
eral nature is declared valid and distinguished from that passed
upon in the two earlier cases by the fact that while the earlier
statute was directed only against persons engaged in mining and
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manufacturing industries, the present applies to all persons, firms
and corporations whatsoever, and is therefore clearly within the
police power of the State.
The Missouri court criticizes the decision in the two earlier
West Virginia cases and declares valid a statute very similar to
the one declared unconstitutional in those cases, basing its deci-
sion upon the general police power, and citing the statutes of sev-
eral American States, and the famous "Truck Act" of i & 2
William IV. c. 37, that finally abolished the "Truck system " in
England. Whatever may be the grounds upon which these stat-
utes and decisions are based, the purpose is the same in every
instance, and they all point to the same end, the suppression of a
system of dealing with the laboring classes that is very susceptible
of abuse, and which, in point of fact, has been very extensively
abused.
In the case of Stone v. Afississ6pPi, 101 U. S. 814, the Supreme
Court lays down the doctrine that the legislature of a State can-
not barter away either the public health or the public morals.
The power of government being a trust committed by the people
to the State no part of it can be granted away and the revocation
of an attempt by a legislature to make such a grant, does not impair
the obligation of a contract within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. The recent decision in the Chicago Lake Front cases,
(Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 13 Supreme Court Reporter
iio), may very properly be considered an application of the princi-
ple governing Stone v. Mississippi, supra. In the Lake Front cases
the question was as to the power of the State of Illinois to revoke
a grant of certain submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake
Michigan. By a divided court it was decided that the grant was
revocable, and thus the power of a State to regulate its navi-
gable waters, harbors, etc., was classed among those govern-
mental powers which are held in trust for the public and by a
grant of which no legislature can irrevocably bind the State.
This proceeds upon the theory that an ownership of land in fee
by any other than the State, though under certain restrictions is
nevertheless inconsistent with the administration of the trust held
by the State for the public and over which functions of govern-
ment are to be exercised. In the language of Mr. Justice Field,
the State can no more abdicate such a trust "than it can abdicate
its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of peace."
